Scaling Security Design Reviews in Medical Device Companies: A Modern, Compliant Approach
What this whitepaper covers
Medical device software lives under one of the densest regulatory stacks in technology: FDA premarket and postmarket cybersecurity guidance, FDA Section 524B, ISO 13485, the Quality System Regulation, IEC 62304, IEC 81001-5-1, HIPAA, and EU MDR. Audits rarely fault medical device companies for skipping SDR; they fault them for doing SDR inconsistently, with threat models that do not trace cleanly through the Design History File to mitigations, tests, and risk acceptance. This whitepaper walks through the framework map device teams need to satisfy at the same time, how traceability from architecture to threat to mitigation to acceptance survives an FDA pre-submission, and which parts of the review still require a human expert (risk acceptance, mitigation selection, regulatory interpretation) even in an AI-assisted program. Drawn from patterns we have seen across multiple device classes and submission types.
What you'll take away
- ✦Framework map a single SDR needs to satisfy: FDA premarket/postmarket cybersecurity guidance, FDA Section 524B, ISO 13485, QSR, IEC 62304, IEC 81001-5-1, HIPAA, and EU MDR
- ✦Audits tend to fault inconsistent threat modeling, not missing SDRs; traceability through the Design History File is where most programs fall short
- ✦DHF traceability chain that survives submission review: architecture → threat → mitigation → test → risk acceptance, every step timestamped and attributed
- ✦Human experts retain authority over risk acceptance, mitigation selection, and regulatory interpretation, even in an AI-assisted program
- ✦Evidence generation as a byproduct of the review, not a separate compliance activity, is what keeps the program sustainable across release cycles
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